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"THERE'S NO SUCCESS LIKE FAILURE/AND
FAILURE'S NO SUCCESS AT ALL"': EXPOSING
THE PRETEXTUALITY OF KANSAS V.
HENDRICKS
Michael L. Perlin *
I. INTRODUCTION
I have spent my entire legal career thinking about the insanity defense.
I have represented defendants who pled insanity, both successfully and un-
successfully, and those who were institutionalized after a successful insan-
ity plea.2 I have taught about the insanity defense, have spoken about it
endlessly, and have written about it perhaps more endlessly. And most of
my recent writing and thinking has been devoted to my seeking answers to
the question that I am convinced-beyond doubt-lies at the base of the in-
sanity defense debate: why do we feel the way we do about "those peo-
ple"?4  Why are we so beholden to myths, to stereotypes, to medieval
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., Rutgers University; J.D., Columbia University
School of Law. The author wishes to thank Jennifer Burgess and Christine Morton for their helpful re-
search assistance.
1 BOB DYLAN, Love Minus Zero/No Limit, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME (Sony Music 1965).
2 See, eg., State v. Fields, 390 A.2d 574 (NJ. 1978) (insanity acquittees entitled to same periodic
review rights as are civil patients) (represented defendant in state Supreme Court); State v. Krol, 344
A.2d 289 (N.J. 1975) (establishing dangerousness standard in cases involving release of insanity acquit-
tees) (represented defendant at habeas hearings both prior to and subsequent to state supreme court deci-
sion).
3 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994); Michael L.
Perlin, Myths, Realities, and the Political World: The Anthropology of Insanity Defense Attitudes, 24
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin, Anthropology]; Michael L. Perlin,
Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69
NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Perlin, Psychodynamics]; Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which
Separated You From Me": The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the
Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375 (1997); Michael L. Perlin, The Insanity Defense: Decon-
structing the Myths and Reconstructing the Jurisprudence, in LAW, MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL
DISORDER 341 (Bruce Sales & Daniel Shuman eds., 1996); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths:
The Symbolism Mythology ofInsanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599 (1989-90)
[hereinafter Perlin, Myths].
4 Perlin, Anthropology, supra note 3, at 6-7.
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concepts of good and bad, of mental illness and sin? Why has this popula-
tion been seen as the "most despised" group of individuals in society?'
I believe that I have made some modest headway in answering some of
these questions. My belief is supported by the way the media seems, in the
wake of the Unabomer case, to be understanding some of the fundamental
issues in ways that promise the possibility of a new insight into this popula-
tion, and perhaps some coherent answers to the question I have posed.
On the other hand, I realize that this is a kind of a trompe l'oeil illusion.
If we are no longer focusing on insanity defendants as the most "despised"
group in society, it is more likely because there is a new universe of "mon-
sters" replacing them in our demonology: sex offenders, known variously,
as mentally disordered sex offenders, or sexually violent predators, the ul-
timate "other.",7 The 1994 murder of Megan Kanka, within miles of my
home, and the subsequent flurry of "Megan's Law"-type legislation has fo-
cused the public's attention and enmity on this category of criminal defen-
dant.8 The sex offender, especially the one who preys on strangers'
children, has become the lightening rod for our fears, our hatreds, and our
punitive urges. Legislation passes within days of introduction and without
debate, statutes are quickly upheld, and we feel, somehow, that we are
"doing something" to combat the most nightmarish, least understandable,
and least excusable criminal behavior. What we are doing is ominously
returning to the days of what many of us .had thought was a less enlight-
ened, and thus discarded, past.
Kansas v. Hendricks ° returns us to this past, and does so with a venge-
ance. For Hendricks-in upholding a state law sanctioning long-term in-
5 Successful insanity defendants have traditionally been perceived as perhaps the "most despised"
and most "morally repugnant" group of individuals in society. See Deborah C. Scott et al., Monitoring
Insanity Acquittees: Connecticut's Psychiatric Security Review Board, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 980, 982 (1990).
6 See e.g., Fox Butterfield, Unabom Trial Highlighting Ambiguity of Mental Illness, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 11, 1998, at Al; Ellen Goodman, Bad or Mad? Inexact Sciences Meet at Juncture Where Evil Con-
fronts Illness, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 11, 1998, at 6J; Gordon Witkin, What Does It Take To be
Crazy? U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 12, 1998, at 7.
7 See Michael Perlin, On "Sanism, " 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374 (1992); see also Lucy Berliner, Sex
Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1203 (1998); Eric S. Janus, Foreshadowing the Fu-
ture of Kansas v. Hendricks: Lessons from Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment Litigation, 92 NW. U.
L. REv. 1279 (1998).
8 See generally infra text accompanying notes 25-28. On Megan Kanka's death, see Robert F.
Freeman-Longo, Reducing Sexual Abuse in America: Legislating Tougher Laws or Public Education
and Prevention?, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFNEMENT 303, 313 (1997).
9 See e.g., James Hacking, Won't You Be My Neighbor?: Do Community Notification Statutes Vio-
late Sexual Offenders'Rights Under the Constitution's Ban of Ex Post Facto Laws?, 41 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 761, 762 (1997); Kathleen Heaphy, Megan's Law: Protecting the Vulnerable or Unconstitutionally
Punishing Sex Offenders?, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 913, 913 (1997); Brian Telpner, Constructing
Safe Communities: Megan's Laws and the Purposes of Punishment, 85 GEO. L.J. 2039,2039 (1997).
10 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). See generally, 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL, § 2A-3.3 at 75-92 (1998) (2d ed.).
1248
Exposing the Pretextuality ofKansas v. Hendricks
stitutionalization of "sexually violent predators"X-is not simply, in my
mind, a constitutionally indefensible and intellectually muddled opinion. It
is also a pretextual opinion. 2 Mental disability law is permeated by a kind
of meretricious pretextuality that is outcome-driven, acontextual and
amoral. The Hendricks case reflects this pretextuality, and in so doing, re-
veals to us much of what is wrong with the development of mental disabil-
ity law jurisprudence. It is this theme upon which I will focus in this
Article.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Hendricks is a confused
and confusing opinion.13 Yet, if the public were to be polled, I am confi-
dent that an overwhelming majority of American citizens would endorse the
Court's decision, upholding the statute's constitutionality, and express puz-
zlement and outrage that law professors, psychiatrists and other scholars
could even question the rationale of the opinion or worry about its potential
constitutional implications. And that dissonance-the distance that we, as
professors, are now removed from our fellow citizens-gives me some
pause. No matter how countermajoritarian I would like my Supreme Court
to be 14 (and I often want it to be very countermajoritarian), I fear that the
"tensile strength"15 of our system is always in peril if judicial declarations
are simply too far removed from any kind of public political consensus.
Having said this, however, I am convinced that the Hendricks decision is a
bad decision. It is bad law, bad social policy, and bad mental health. It is a
case of "degraded" status.16 It is also, as I have said, an extraordinarily
pretextual decision. It is this pretextuality that requires some further con-
sideration.
My Article will proceed in this manner. First, I will briefly discuss the
historical roots that led us to a world in which Hendricks could be litigated.
Then I will explain what I mean by "pretextuality," and will show how
pretextuality permeates all mental disability law. Next, I will briefly dis-
cuss the Hendricks case, and then focus on those aspects I find the most
troubling. I will then discuss Hendricks's pretextual bases, and in conclu-
sion, seek to contextualize the implications of that pretextuality with both
past and possible subsequent mental disability law developments.
My title is drawn from what is perhaps the most ambiguous couplet in
Bob Dylan's elegiac love ballad, Love Minus Zero/No Limit. The narrator,
" Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2080-86.
12 See infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
13 See Michael L. Perlin, "'Mixed-Up Confusion": Kansas v. Hendricks, Sexually Violent Predator
Laws, and Empty Promises, 2 HEALTH L.J. 3 (Fall 1997).
14 See, eg., Suzanna Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the Burger Court: Saving the Community from
Itself, 70 MiNN. L. REv. 611,650-52 (1986).
15 Perlin, Myths, supra note 3, at 613-15 (discussing concepts raised in Linda Fentiman, "Guilty But
Mentally 111": The Real Verdict is Guilty, 12 B.C. L. REV. 601, 611 n.63 (1985) (quoting Professor
Ernest Roberts)).
16 See Janus, supra note 7, at 1280-81.
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in discussing his lover, sings, "She knows there's no success like fail-
ure/And that failure's no success at all." I have pondered, mostly unsuc-
cessfully, the meaning of this lyric in the thirty-three years that have passed
since, as a college student, I purchased my vinyl copy of Dylan's magnifi-
cent early album, Bringing It All Back Home. And it really never came to
me until I sat down to write this paper. Our social policy in dealing with
individuals like Leroy Hendricks has been a failure-a total failure. We
seek to remediate those failures by the enactment of new legislation, such as
the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), and label those enact-
ments as a success (in spite of a startling lack of empirical evidence sup-
porting that label). The reality, I have regretfully concluded, is that such
laws are a failure (in some important ways, even more of a failure than what
preceded them). And these failures-no matter what we want to believe-
are no success at all.
II. A SHORT HISTORY 7
Prior to the 1970s, most states had enacted statutes providing for the
commitment of sexual offenders. These laws often provided for indefinite,
potentially lifetime, institutionalization for those who were classified as
"repetitive and compulsive" sex offenders, 8 and were commonly seen as an
appropriate use of the police power. These laws were also premised on a
therapeutic basis: they assumed that mental health professionals could make
accurate predictions about an offender's future behavior, and that some
number of offenders might be treatable.' 9 By 1970, there were sex offender
laws in sixty percent of all American jurisdictions.20
However, by the time that the Supreme Court's "civil rights revolution"
reached mental disability law,21 psychiatrists and lawyers were both begin-
ning to challenge the assumption that sex offenders were both mentally ill
and treatable. Influential professional organizations advocated the repeal of
such statutes "because of the dubious theoretical and empirical relationship
between a specific mental disability and sexually violent tendencies."1
2
After the Supreme Court ruled that sex offenders could not be committed to
17 The material infra accompanying notes 17-28 is generally adapted from PERLIN, supra note 10, at
§ 2A-3.3, at 75-76 (2d ed.).
18 See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:164-3, repealed by L. 1978, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:98-2 (West
1998). See generally Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1317 (1998)
19 See Jeffrey Klotz, Sex Offenders and the Law: New Directions, in LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY:
DEVELOPMENTS ON THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 131, 133 (David Wexler & Bruce Winick eds.,
1997) (citing Robert Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on Washington's Sexually Violent Predators
Statute, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 597 (1992)).
20 See id. at 133.
21 See I Perlin, supra note 10, § 1-2.1 (2d ed.).
22 Klotz, supra note 19, at 133 (citing James Reardon, Sexual Predators: Mental Illness ofAbnor-
mality? A Psychiatrist's Perspective, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 849 (1992)).
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a treatment facility until they were found guilty-at a hearing with full pro-
cedural protections--of having committed the antecedent criminal acts,23
sex offender statutes fell into disfavor, and many states began to repeal
these laws.24
This trend was sharply reversed, however, in 1990, when the state of
Washington-responding to a particularly heinous murder25-"revamp[ed]
and resurrect[ed] its sex offender involuntary commitment system."26 Other
states followed quickly, many in the wake of New Jersey's enactment of
"Megan's Law."27 By 1997, Justice Breyer was able to locate at least sev-
enteen states with some kind of "modem" sex offender statute.28
All of these statutes are based on a legislative desire to protect the
public from a group of offenders that is widely despised: criminals who
sexually abuse and molest young children. 29  They differ in content, but
share certain elements. In each case, the state must prove by a quantum of
either "beyond a reasonable doubt" or "clear and convincing evidence" (1)
a history of violent acts, (2) a current mental disorder or abnormality, (3)
the likelihood of future sexually harmful acts, and (4) a nexus between all
of the first three elements. 30  In most of these statutes, commitment is in-
definite, and release is allowed when it is shown that the offender is no
longer dangerous by reason of a mental disorder.3'
Kansas enacted its Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) in 1994 as a
means of seeking the institutionalization of that "small but extremely dan-
gerous group of sexually violent predators ... who do not have a mental
disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment
pursuant to the [general involuntary civil commitment statute.]" 32  It
See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608-09(1967); see also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,
512 (1972) (recommitment to facilities for sexual offenders required same bundle of procedural
protections as those used in civil commitment hearings).
24 See Klotz, supra note 19, at 133 (citing, inter alia, Mark Small, The Legal Context of Mentally
Disordered Sex Offender (MDSO) Treatment Programs, 19 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 127 (1992)).
25 See Raquel Blacher, Historical Perspective on the "Sex Psychopath " Statute: From the Revolu-
tionary Era to the Present Federal Crime Bill, 46 MERCER L. REV. 889, 914-15 (1995). On the way that
one vivid case can drive an entire area ofjurisprudence, see Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 3.
26 Klotz, supra note 19, at 133; see Berliner, supra note 7, at nn.124-34 and accompanying text.27 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 to 7-11.
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2095 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). A review of the
articles written in the wake of Hendricks suggests that several additional states, perhaps as many as 30,
are considering similar laws. See Meaghan Downey Kolebuck, Kansas v. Hendricks: Is it Time to Lock
the Door and Throw Away the Key for Sexually Violent Predators? 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 537, 561 n.168 (1998).
29 See e.g., Jeffrey Klotz, Sex Offenders and the Law: New Directions, in MENTAL HEALTH AND
LAW: RESEARCH POLICY AND SERVICES 257 (Bruce Sales & Saleem Shah eds., 1996).
30 See Eric Janus, The Use of Social Science and Medicine in Sex Offender Commitment, 23 NEw
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 347, 348-49 (1997) (citing statutes).
31 See id. at 349 (citing statutes).
32 Hendricks 117 S. Ct. at 2077 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (preamble) (West 1997)).
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established a separate commitment process for "the long-term care and
treatment of the sexually violent predator," statutorily defined as: "[A]ny
person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent of-
fense and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual




My thesis is simple: the entire relationship between the legal process
and mentally disabled litigants is often pretextual By pretextuality, I mean
simply that courts accept, either implicitly or explicitly, testimonial dishon-
esty and engage similarly in dishonest decisionmaking.35 This pretextuality
is poisonous. It infects all those involved in the legal process, breeds cyni-
cism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants, reinforces shoddy
lawyering, invites blase judging, and, at times, promotes perjurious and cor-
rupt testifying. The reality is well known to frequent consumers of judicial
33 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (West 1997).
34 The material infra accompanying notes 34-80 is generally adapted from MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
"ON THE WATERS OF OBLIVION": SANISM, PRETEXTUALITY, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW ch. 2D (1998) (forthcoming, title and chapter headings subject to change) [hereinafter
PERLIN, OBLIVION]; see also Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Com-
petency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993).
Beyond the scope of this paper is an inquiry into how Hendricks is also a sanist decision as well. See
Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism. " 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 374 (1992) (defining "sanism" as "an irrational
prejudice, an 'ism,' of the same quality and character of other prevailing prejudices such as racism, sex-
ism, heterosexism and ethnic bigotry that [is] reflected both in our legal system and in the ways that
lawyers represent clients, [and that] infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices"). We are
especially sanist when it comes to questions concerning the sexuality of persons with mental disabilities.
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last
Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 537 (1993-94) [hereinafter Perlin, Frontier] (foot-
notes omitted):
Our attitudes toward the sexuality of persons with mental disabilities reflect and reify this
myth. Society tends to infantilize the sexual urges, desires, and needs of the mentally disabled.
Alternatively, they are regarded as possessing an animalistic hypersexuality, which warrants the
imposition of special protections and limitations on their sexual behavior to stop them from acting
on these "primitive" urges.
35 See Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common
Sense, " Heuristic Reasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131,
133 (1991). This is apparent specifically where witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high
propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to achieve desired ends." Charles Sevilla, The
Exclusionary Rule and Police Perjury, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 840 (1974); cf Edwin J. Butterfoss,
Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrications in the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 KY. L.J. 1 n.1 (1990-91) (defining "pretexts" to include situa-
tions where "the government offers a justification for activity that, if the motivation of the [police] offi-
cer is not considered, would be a legally sufficient justification for the activity" as well as for those
activities for which the proferred justification is "legally insufficient").
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services in this area: to mental health advocates and other public defender,
legal aid, and legal service lawyers assigned to represent patients and men-
tally disabled criminal defendants, to prosecutors and state attorneys as-
signed to represent hospitals, to judges who regularly hear such cases, to
expert and lay witnesses, and, most importantly, to the mentally disabled
person involved in the litigation in question.
Pretextuality helps create a system that: (1) accepts dishonest testi-
mony unthinkingly; (2) regularly subverts statutory and case law standards;
and (3) raises insurmountable barriers that ensure the allegedly "therapeuti-
cally correct" social outcome and avoidance of the worst-case-disaster fan-
tasy, the false negative. In short, the mental disability law system often
deprives individuals of liberty disingenuously and for reasons that have no
relationship to case law or to statutes.
This aspect of the mental disability law system is astonishingly "un-
derconsidered" by advocates, 36 scholars and professional associations alike.
Examining the way that "moral" experts testify in "sanist" courts promotes
better understanding of the extent of the prevailing pretexts. This under-
standing will encourage new strategies for confronting the underlying bi-
ases, creating a new structure, and developing a new research agenda
through which these issues can be examined openly.
How did pretextuality come to infect the legal system? The law prides
itself on its fairness and its inherent sense of rationality.3 7 The legal trial
process presupposes an ascertainable "truth" as a basis for testimony, 38 and
severe sanctions are imposed for the commission of perjury.39 Psychiatry
and psychology, in turn, reject notions of a unitary concept of "reason,"
pointing out that the range of human behavior is infinite, and that uncon-
scious variables and processes, conflicts, anxieties and defenses are fre-
quently the primary causes of behavior.40 Mental health professionals also
counsel practitioners not to impose their sense of "morality" on patients or
36 On counsel's role in general, see Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of
the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992).
37 See e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 243, 405-07 (1986); Ernest Weinrib, Legal Formal-
ism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 954 n.14 (1988) (citing Thomas Aquinas,
Treatise on Law, in SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II QQ 90-105, reprinted in ON LAW, MORALITY, AND
POLITICS 11-83 (W. Baumgarth & R. Regan eds., 1988)).
38 See, for example, for relatively recent formulations, State v. Stevens, 558 A.2d 833, 840 (N.J.
1989), and Pena v. State, 780 P.2d 316, 334 (Wyo. 1989), both citing Note, Other Crimes Evidence At
Trial, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 770-71 (1961); Ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Lloyd, 787 P.2d 855, 859 (Okla.
1990); Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 744 S.W.2d 407, 414 (Ky. 1987). For a psychoanalytic view, see
ALBERT EHRENZ\VEIG, PSYCHOANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE 277-81 (1971).
39 See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 837.02 & 775.082 (West 1997) (up to 5 years and $5000 fine); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-1 (West 1998) (3 to 5 years); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 210.15 and 70.00(2)(d)
(McKinney 1988) (up to 7 years).
40 See MICHAEL MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 142 (1984); see
generally, OTTO WILL, PROCESS, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA (1961), reprinted in
PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW 680-84 (Joseph Katz et al. eds, 1967).
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clients,4' nor to employ their authority as a defense in dealing with such cli-
ents.42
Where these two systems intersect, something strange happens. Per-
haps because of the "substantial gulf between scientific and legal dis-
course, ' 4 3 perhaps because of the different training received by mental
health professionals and lawyers," perhaps because of the public's radically
differing perceptions of the substance of law and the mental health profes-
sions, 45 those who are involved in both professional arenas must consider
the way that these internal and inherent differences create tensions that have
a measurable effect on what happens when these cultures collide, especially
in the forensic mental disability system.
This collision can be viewed from several vantage points that have not
been seriously explored: from the perspectives of the way that law, the sys-
tem extolling "truth" as a highest virtue, adopts pretextuality as a means of
dealing with information or situations that it finds troubling or dissonant,
and the way that the mental health professions, the systems that counsel
against attributions of "morality" in interpersonal dealings, impose a self-
referential concept of morality in dealing with legal interactions. I believe
that, if we are to understand why the historic relationship46 between the law
and the mental health professions is seen as a rocky one, characterized vari-
ously as an uneasy detente, a shotgun marriage or a mariage de con-
v~nance,47 it is necessary to consider the question through these two filters
of pretextuality and morality.
41 See, e.g., ROSEMARY BALSAM & ALAN BALSAM, THE BOOK OF FAMILY THERAPY BECOMING A
PSYCHOTHERAPIST: A CLINICAL PRIMER 108-11 (1974); ALFRED BENJAMIN, THE HELPING INTERVIEW
140-43 (1969); 2 ROBERT LANGS, THE TECHNIQUES OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 294-97 (2d
ed. 1976); 2 FREDERICK PERLS ET AL., GESTALT THERAPY 510-11 (2d ed. 1973); CARL ROGERS,
COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: NEWER CONCEPTS IN PRACTICE 327 (1942).
42 See BENJAMIN, supra note 41, at 92-95.
43 Harold Green, The Law-Science Interface in Public Policy Decision Making, 51 OHIO ST. L.J.
375,405 (1990).
44 Some psychiatrists see this difference as critical in explaining what they perceive as differences
in the perspectives of the two professions. See eg., MICHAEL PESZKE, INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT OF
THE MENTALLY ILL 133-36 (1975) (law students' interest in law and psychiatry comes from students'
desires "to leam how to punch holes and to show the psychiatrist up in court"); H. Richard Lamb, Invol-
untary Treatment for the Homeless Mentally l, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 169, 276
(1989) (discussing Szasz, Goffman and Laing as intellectually animating sources for "many attorneys").
45 See e.g., Bentley, The Infant and the Dream: Psychology and the Law, in PSYCHOLOGY, LAW
AND LEGAL PROBLEMS 35 (David Farrington et al. eds., 1979); S.B. Cohen, The Evolutionary Relation-
ship Between Psychiatry and Law, in PSYCHIATRY, LAW AND ETHICS 69 (Armon Carmi et al. eds.,
1986).
46 See JUDITH NEAMAN, SUGGESTION OF THE DEVIL: THE ORIGINS OF MADNESS 67-110 (1975)
(relationship dates back to Roman law and Justinian codes).
47 See JONAS ROBITSCHER, PURSUIT OF AGREEMENT: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 12 (1966) (citing
F. A. WHITLOCK, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1963)). See generally 1 PERLIN,
supra note 10, § I-I at 1-2 n.2 (2d ed.). Compare Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, The Adversary
System, in VIOLENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON MURDER AND AGGRESSION 394 (Seymour Kutash et al. eds.,
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Much of what lawyers say about forensic testimony is pretextual.48
Much of what forensic mental health professionals who frequently wear the
hat of expert witness say about individual cases is similarly pretextual, os-
tensibly for reasons of "morality."49 And much of the way judges interpret
forensic testimony is teleological.50 I believe that these interpretive clues
help explain much of the confusion in mental disability law.
Little of any of this can be coherently explained without refuge to such
cognitive psychology constructs as heuristic reasoning, psychological reac-
tance, and cognitive dissonance.Y The relationship between the mutually
1978) ("[T]he intersection of law and mental health stands at a significant focal point in the development
of human behavior, at a point where motives, intents, and drives can and must be examined in the con-
texts of rights, obligations, duties and the social order.").
48 See PERLIN, supra note 34, manuscript at 102-03.
49 See id. at 106-11.
5o See id. at 113-39.
SI See generally Perlin, Psychodynamics, supra note 3. For an interdisciplinary investigation of the
role of cognitive dissonance in human behavior, see William Davis, Economists' Uses for Cognitive Dis-
sonance: An Interdisciplinary Note, 73 PSYCHOLOG. REP. 1179, 1180 (1993).
Especially pernicious is the "vividness" effect. Behavioral scientists are aware of the power of what
Dr. David Rosenhan has characterized as the "distortions of vivid information." As part of this phe-
nomenon, "concrete and vivid information" about a specific case "overwhelms" the abstract data...
upon which rational choices are often made." David Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial
Policies, STAN. LAW., Fall 1984, at 10, 13-14. Thus, "the more vivid and concrete is better remem-
bered, over recitals of fact and logic." Marilyn Ford, The Role of Extralegal Factors in Jury Verdicts,
I 1 JUST. SYS. J. 16, 23, (1986); see also Steven C. Bank & Norman G. Polythress, The Elements of Per-
suasion In Expert Testimony, J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 173 (1982). Studies have shown further that the
"vividness" effect is actively present in judicial proceedings. See e.g., Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F.
Loftus, Vivid Persuasion in the Courtrooom, 49 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 659, 663 (1985) (vivid
information at trial may "gamer more attention, recruit more attention from memory, be perceived as
having a more credible source, and have a greater affective impact"); Ruth Hamill et al., Insensitivity to
Sample Bias: Generalizing from Atypical Cases, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 578 (1980) (sub-
jects presented with information about one welfare recipient generalized data to all recipients even when
told the particular exemplar was "highly atypical of the population at large").
On the impact that vivid events have on police policies dealing with persons with mental disability,
see Peter Finn & Monique Sullivan, Police Handling of the Mentally 1ll: Sharing Responsibility With the
Mental Health System, 17 J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 4 (1989). Our perceptions ofjudicial proceedings are also
influenced. See, eg., Shari Seidman Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial Leniency on
Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73, 87-88 (1989) (vividness of media stories about particularly violent
criminal offenses has a "disproportionate impact" on public perceptions about crime); Albert W. Al-
schuler, "Close Enough for Government Work": The Exclusionary Rule After Leon, 1984 Sup. CT. REv.
309, 347-48 (fear that application of exclusionary rule might potentially free "next year's Son of Sam"
will overwhelm empirically based arguments in support of rule); Richard E. Nisbett et al., Popular In-
duction: Information Is Not Necessarily Informative, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES 101, 113 (Daniel Kahneman etal. eds., 1982) (comparing "influenceability" by abstract and
concrete information); Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding perceived Risk, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra at 463, 468; (impact of biased news-
paper coverage on perceived risks in cases of various disaster scenarios); Loretta J. Stalans & Arthur J.
Lurigio, Law and Professionals'Beliefs About Crime and Criminal Sentences: A Need for Theory, Per-
haps Schema Theory, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 333 (1990) (lay persons rely disproportionately on un-
representative impressions in forming beliefs about punishment and crime).
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symbiotic systems of law and forensic mental health is an increasingly
fragile one, and, as the acquittal of would-be presidential assassin John
Hinckley demonstrated, one outrageous case can wipe out the results of
years of study, collection of empirical data and reflective inquiry into any
aspect of the mental health system.s2 Finally, most of what is written-in
both law and the mental health literature-utterly ignores both of my major
premises as well as these two propositions.5 3 I hope that this Article leads
both lawyers and mental health professionals to come to recognize that,
even if the pursuit of agreement5 4 appears to be beyond us, we can at least
acknowledge there are bridges to be built.
B. Pretextuality and Mental Disability Law
The relationship between empirical pretextuality and the trial of mental
disability cases is an important and profound one. Pretextual devices, such
as condoning perjured testimony, distorting readings of trial testimony,
subordinating statistically significant social science data, and enacting pro-
phylactic civil rights laws that have absolutely no "real world" impact,
similarly dominate the mental disability law landscape. These devices usu-
ally flow from the same motives that inspire similar behavior by courts and
legislatures in other cases.
Again, a few examples illustrate this point. Although the District of
Columbia Code contains a provision authorizing patients to seek either pe-
riodic review of their commitment or independent psychiatric evaluations,
in the first twenty-two years following the law's passage, not a single pa-
tient exercised his right to statutory review.55 While Attorney General Wil-
liam French Smith told Congress that the insanity defense "allows so many
persons to commit crimes of violence," one of his top aides candidly told a
52 See generally, Perlin, Myths, supra note 3; cf. Jonas Rappeport, Editorial: Is Forensic Psychiatry
Ethical, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 205 (1984) (society's response to the Hinckley acquit-
tal "placed the blame on the insanity plea and the psychiatrists"). It is necessary to acknowledge that
there are at least two universes worthy of consideration in this context: the case such as Hinckley's that
captures the attention of the whole nation, and the vivid case that may be unknown nationally but in
which local interest is so heavy that its disposition may overwhelm a statewide legal system. See, e.g.,
William Fischer et al., How Flexible Are Our Civil Commitment Statutes? 39 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 711 (1978) (commitment rates in one Washington county increased 100% following mur-
der by mentally disabled individual who had been denied voluntary admission to psychiatric hospital).
53 Cf Thomas Gutheil et al., Participation in Competency Assessment and Treatment Decisions:
The Role of the Psychiatrist-Attorney Team, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 446, 449
(1987) (discussing "critogenesis"--the "intrinsic risks of legal intervention" in medical decisionmak-
ing); But see THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David Wexler ed.
1990) [hereinafter THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE] (critically investigating the impact of legal rules on
the functioning of the mental health system).
54 See generally ROBITSCHER, supra note 47.
55 See Streicher v. Prescott, 663 F. Supp. 335, 343 (D. D.C. 1987); cf. Kadrmas v. C.W., 453
N.W.2d 806, 809 (N.D. 1990) (rejecting patient's argument that discharge hearings were "rare occur-
rence[s]").
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federal judicial conference that the number of insanity defense cases was,
statistically, "probably insignificant.,1 6 When a state enacts a new statutory
scheme to "treat" sex offenders, but fails to hire any professionals exjeri-
enced in the provision of such treatment, that new statute is pretextual.
There are many other examples. In a case that turned on the question of
whether a defendant had the requisite specific intent to attempt a bank rob-
bery, a federal district court judge refused to allow a county jail psychiatrist
to testify that he prescribed antipsychotic medications for the defendant for
a particular purpose and a particular length of time. The judge reasoned
that such testimony "might be interfering with the treatment of [other] pris-
oners in jails because [they] might ask for more drugs to create the impres-
sion they need more drugs." 8 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
this decision as "not manifestly erroneous," even though there was no evi-S• 59
dence anywhere in the case that spoke to this issue.' Finally, and more
globally, courts and commentators regularly assume that vigorous, inde-
pendent, advocacy-focused counsel is now available to all mentally disabled
litigants, in spite of an empirical reality that this is the case in very few ju-
risdictions.60
56 See Perlin, supra note 35, at 134 (quoting Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The Guilty But
Mentally 11l Verdict Has Both Succeeded In Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved the Traditional
Role of the Insanity Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 980 (1987), and Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 111 F.R.D. 91,225 (1985)).
57 This issue was squarely before the Supreme Court in Hendricks. Compare the passage at 117
S.Ct at 2085 (Hendricks' treatment program "may have seemed somewhat meager"), with that at 117
S.CL at 2093 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (at time of Hendricks's commitment, state had neither funded
treatment programs nor entered into treatment contracts, and provided "little, if any, qualified treatment
staff," concluding Hendricks received "essentially no treatment"). See infra text accompanying notes
81-143. See also Brian G. Bodine, Washington's New Sexual Predator Commitment System: An Uncon-
stitutional Law and An Unwise Policy Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105 (1990); John Q. La
Fond, "The New 'Sexually Violent Predator' Law-America's Unique Sexual Offender Commitment
Law" (April 1992) (unpublished paper presented at the American College of Forensic Psychiatry's Tenth
Annual Symposium, San Francisco, CA, on file with author) (discussing WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.
(1970)). For comprehensive discussions of the issues that are central to this debate, see Janus, supra
note 30, and Eric Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional Boundaries on
Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157 (1996).
58 United States v. Still, 857 F.2d 671, 672 (9th Cir. 1988).
59 Id. In another case, a testifying doctor conceded that he may have "hedged" in earlier testimony
(as to whether an insanity acquittee could be released) "because he did not want to be criticized should
[the defendant] be released and then commit a criminal act." Francois v. Henderson, 850 F.2d 231, 234
(5th Cir. 1988).
60 See Perlin, supra note 36, at 40, 49, 54. Compare In re Micah S., 243 Cal. Rptr. 756, 760 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988) (Brauer, J., concurring) ("As in other areas where counsel is fumished at public expense,
everypetition, however meritorious, is vigorously challenged. 'Cherchez 'avocat' is the battle cry of
every appellate lawyer today.") (parental rights termination case) with Elliott Andalman & David L.
Chambers, Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Pro-
posal, 45 MISS. L.J. 43, 72 (1974) (speculating that counsel was so inadequate in sample studied that
patients' chances for release from hospital were enhanced if no lawyer was present), and George E. Dix,
Acute Psychiatric Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in the Metropolis: An Empirical Study, 1968 WASH
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Police officers perjure themselves in dropsy cases "to ensure that
criminals do not get off on 'technicalities,' 6' and trial judges condone such
behavior to "mediate the draconian effect of imposed-from-above constitu-
tional decisions, 62 such as Mapp v. Ohio.63 In the same way, expert wit-
nesses in civil commitment cases often impose their own self-referential
concept of "morality" to insure that patients who "they believe should be
certified" remain institutionalized. 64 Judges accept this testimony in light of
their own "instrumental, functional, normative and philosophical" dissatis-
faction 65 with decisions such as O'Connor v. Donaldson,66 Jackson v. Indi-
ana,67 and Lessard v. Schmidt 8  Just as judges, including former United
States Supreme Court Chief Justice Burger in his appeals court days, ex-
press doubt that police testimony in dropsy cases requires special scrutiny,69
they also express astonishment at the assertion that expert testimony in in-
voluntary civil commitment cases may be factually inaccurate.7°
U. L.Q. 485, 540 (only two of 1700 contested cases resulted in patient's release). See generally 1
PERLIN, supra note 10, § 2B-6, at 220-223 (2d ed.); Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Is-
sues in the Representation of Individuals in the Commitment Process, 45 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 161
(1982).
61 Tom Barker & David Carter, "Fluffing Up the Evidence and Covering Your Ass': Some Con-
ceptual Notes on Police Lying, 11 DEVIANT BEHAV. 61 (1990); see generally, Christopher Slobogin,
Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1037 (1996).
62 Perlin, supra note 35, at 134; see also Myron Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Fac-
tor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 75, 121 (1992) (judges
refuse to suppress evidence because of: (1) their personal "sense of justice"; (2) the fear of adverse
publicity; and (3) the fear that such a decision might lead to reelection difficulties). For a rare candid
judicial articulation of this position, see Rogers v. State, 332 So. 2d 165, 167 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)
(quoting trial judge, "In Alabama we had sensible [criminal procedure] rules until the damn Supreme
Court went crazy."), cert. denied. 332 So. 2d 168 (Ala. 1976).
63 367 U.S. 543 (1961).
See William 0. McCormick, Involuntary Commitment in Ontario: Some Barriers to the Provision
of Proper Care, 124 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 715,717 (1981).
65 See Perlin, supra note 35, at 134.
66 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (right to liberty).
67 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (application of Due Process Clause to commitments following incompetency
to stand trial findings).
68 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (application of substantive and procedural Due Process
Clauses to involuntary civil commitment process).
69 See Bush v. United States, 375 F.2d 602, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("[I]t would be a dismal reflection
on society to say that when the guardians of its security are called to testify in court under oath, their
testimony must be viewed with suspicion."). But see People v. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 197 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 1970) (Younger, J.) (disagreeing with Justice Burger's point of view); see also Orfield, supra
note 62. McMurty is discussed in Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New
Credibility Gap, 60 GEo. L.J. 507 (1971).
70 Opinion testimony by psychiatrists is "routinely and unquestioningly accepted" at involuntary
civil commitment hearings. Marilyn Hammond, Predictions of Dangerousness in Texas: Psychothera-
pists' Conflicting Duties, Their Potential Liability, and Possible Solutions, 12 ST. MARY'S L.J. 141, 150
n.71 (1980); see also In re Melton, 597 A.2d 892, 902 (D.C. 1991) (asking "Where else would the doc-
tor go for such information?" in response to a patient's argument that it was violation of the hearsay
rules for witness to base his medical conclusion on factual information given him by the patient's rela-
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In addition, courts fantasize about feared pretextuality in cases where
anecdotal myths prevail or where unconscious values predominate. 7' For
instance, the North Carolina Supreme Court credited a sheriffs lay opinion
that a defendant whose competence to stand trial was at issue had learned to
feign mental illness after speaking to state prisoners during his pretrial in-
carceration. The court gave less weight to the uncontradicted clinical testi-
mony that the defendant was schizophrenic, mentally retarded, and
suffering from acute pathological intoxication.72 The fear that defendants
will "fake" the insanity defense to escape punishment continues to paralyze
the legal system in spite of an impressive array of empirical evidence re-
vealing: (1) the minuscule number of such cases; (2) the ease with which
trained clinicians are usually able to "catch" malingering in such cases; (3)
the inverse greater likelihood that defendants, even at grave peril to their
life, will more likely try to convince examiners that they're "not crazy"; (4)
the high risk in pleading the insanity defense (leading to statistically signifi-
cant greater prison terms meted out to unsuccessful insanity pleaders); and
(5) the fact that most of the small number of insanity pleaders who are suc-
cessful remain in maximum security facilities for a longer period than they
would have if convicted of the underlying criminal indictment.73
Consider the recent New Jersey state case of State v. Inglis,74 where the
court, citing no authority, simply states, "[t]he insanity defense has a high
potential of serving as an instrument of pretext." 75 None of the easily ac-
cessible, empirically grounded evidence7 had any impact on the trial judge
in Inglis, nor does it generally have such an impact on decisionmakers in
other such cases. It is no wonder that, in writing about the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Parham v. J.R.,7 Professor Stephen Morse
noted, "[a]s is so often true in mental health cases, the Court based its
tives). For discussion on the application of the hearsay rules to the involuntary civil commitment proc-
ess in general, see 1 PERLIN, supra note 10, § 2C-4.13a, at 377-82 (2d ed.). See also United States v.
Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc). Appellate courts rarely consider whether mental
disability law proceedings elicit or suppress "the truth." For thoughtful and conflicting visions, compare
the majority opinion in In Re Commitment of Edward S., 570 A.2d 917 (N.J. 1990), with Judge Han-
dler's concurrence (statutory mandate requiring that involuntary civil commitment hearings be held in
camera deemed inapplicable to cases involving insanity acquittees).
71 See Perlin, supra note 35, at 134.
72 See State v. Willard, 234 S.E.2d 587,591-93 (N.C. 1977).
73 See Perlin, Myths, supra note 3, at 648-55,713-21.
74 698 A. 2d 1296 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997).
75 Id. at 1298.
76 See HENRY STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE
REFORM (1993).
77 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (limiting procedural due process rights of juveniles facing involuntary civil
commitment); see generally 1 PERLIN, supra note 10, § 2C-7.1a (2d ed.).
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opinion on a number of factual assumptions that are simply insupport-
able. '
78
For a very different example, look at the Second Circuit's decision in
United States v. Schmidt.79 Schmidt was a criminal case, stemming from
allegations that the defendant plotted to kill two federal agents, solicited
others to commit the crime, and then escaped from custody. At the time of
her trial, she was confined in a state prison's psychiatric treatment unit, and
in fact, proffered an unsuccessful diminished capacity defense (proceeding
pro se). Both her competence to stand trial and her competence to be sen-
tenced were sharply contested, with the government insisting throughout
that she was malingering. Yet, after her conviction, the government moved
to have her committed to a mental institution, alleging that she suffered
from a "serious mental disease." 80 The government's positions here are
clearly inconsistent; of course, they are also pretextual.
In short, mental disability law is replete with textbook examples of
both conscious and unconscious pretextuality in the law. This pretextuality
is reflected consciously, in the reception and privileging of "moral" testi-
mony that flouts legislative criteria, and unconsciously, in the use of heu-




Leroy Hendricks had been convicted of taking "indecent liberties" with
two teenaged boys, and was subsequently sentenced to a term of five to
twenty years in state prison. 2 Shortly before his scheduled release from
prison, the state invoked the SVPA, seeking to have him civilly committed
as a sexually violent predator.83 At the subsequent jury trial, Hendricks tes-
tified as to his past history of sexual offenses and to his self-described in-
ability to refrain from committing such offenses, stating that he "can't
78 Stephen Morse, Treating Crazy People Less Specially, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 353, 382 n.64 (1987);
see generally Michael L. Perlin, An Invitation to the Dance: An Empirical Response to Chief Justice
Warren Burger's "'Time-Consuming Procedural Minuets" Theory in Parham v. J.R., 9 BULL. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 149 (1981) (sharply criticizing Parham decision); Gail Perry & Gary Melton,
Precedential Value of Judicial Notice of Social Facts: Parham as an Example, 22 J. FAM. L. 633 (1984)
(same).
79 105 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 1997).
so Id. at 84.
81 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). See generally, Perlin, supra note 13; 1 PERLIN, supra note 10, § 2A-3.3
(2d ed.).
82 Matter of Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996), reversed, 117 S. Ct.
2072 (1997). Hendricks had been arrested and convicted at least 5 prior times on other charges stem-
ming from sexual offenses committed against children or teenagers. See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2078.
83 See Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996).
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control the urge., 84 Expert witnesses testified that Hendricks's diagnosis
was "personality trait disturbance, passive-aggressive personality and pedo-
philia, "and that pedophilia qualified as a "mental abnormality" under the
SVPA.8s The State's expert testified that Hendricks was likely to commit
sexual offenses against children in the future if he were not to be commit-
ted; Hendricks's expert testified that it was not possible to predict with any
degree of accuracy the future dangerousness of a sex offender.86
The jury unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hendricks
was a sexually violent predator. Following this finding, the trial judge de-
termined as a matter of state law that pedophilia was a "mental abnormal-
ity" under state law, and Hendricks was subsequently committed.
The Kansas Supreme Court reversed the order of commitment, agree-
ing with Hendricks that the SVPA violated the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. It further found that, in order to commit a person involuntar-
ily in a civil proceeding, a State is required by "substantive" due process to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person is both (1) mentally
ill, and (2) a danger to himself or to others.88 It then determined that the
Act's definition of "mental abnormality" did not satisfy what it perceived to
be Kansas's "mental illness" requirement in the civil commitment context,
and as a result, held that Hendricks's substantive due process rights were
violated. 9
The United States Supreme Court, per Justice Thomas, reversed, and
reinstated the order of commitment. First, the majority found that the stat-
ute's use of the phrase "mental abnormality" satisfied substantive due proc-
ess guarantees, citing Foucha v. Louisiana" for the proposition that the
liberty interest in cases involving freedom from physical restraint is "not
absolute,"91 and looking to Addington v. Texas92 for support of the proposi-
tion that "it thus cannot be said that the involuntary civil confinement of a
limited subclass of dangerous persons is contrary to our understanding of
ordered liberty. 93
Commitment ordinarily requires proof of dangerousness and "some
additional factor" such as "mental abnormality" or "mental illness," thus
limiting involuntary civil confinement to those who "suffer from a voli-
84 Id.
85 Id. at 2079 n.2. For a detailed examination of diagnostic categories regarding sex offenders, see
J. Michael Bailey & Aaron Greenberg, The Science and Ethics of Castration: Lessons from the Morse
Case, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1225, nn.2-13 and accompanying text (1998).
86 See id.
87 Id.
88 Matter of Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 137 (Kan. 1996).
89 Id. at 138.
90 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); see generally PERLIN, supra note 10, § 15.25A (1997 Cum. Supp.).
91 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079.
92 441 U.S. 418,426 (1979); see generally I PERLIN, supra note 10, §§ 2C-5.1 to 2C-5.lb (2d ed.).
93 Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 1079-80.
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tional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control."94 The
Kansas statute thus was like other statutes that the Court had upheld:
It requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding
to the existence of a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" that makes
it difficult, if not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.
[citation omitted]. The precommitment requirement of a "mental abnormality"
or "personality disorder" is consistent with the requirements of these other
statutes that we have upheld in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for
confinement to those who are unable to control their dangerousness.
95
The Court rejected Hendricks's argument that Addington96 and
Foucha97 required proof of a mental illness, and that his "mental abnormal-
ity" was not such an illness (but was rather a term coined by the Kansas
legislature). Stated the Court:
Contrary to Hendricks' assertion, the term "mental illness" is devoid of
any talismanic significance. Not only do "psychiatrists disagree widely and
frequently on what constitutes mental illness," but the Court itself has used a
variety of expressions to describe the mental condition of those properly sub-
ject to civil confinement.98
Pedophilia, the Court reasoned, was classified by "the psychiatric pro-
fession" as a "serious mental disorder;" this disorder-marked by a lack of
volitional control, coupled with predictions of future dangerousness-
"adequately distinguishes Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are
perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively through criminal
proceedings."9 9 Hendricks's diagnosis as a pedophile, which qualifies as a
"mental abnormality" under the Act, thus "plainly suffice[d]" for due
process purposes.100
94 Id. at 2080.
95 Id.
96 441 U.S. 418 (1979)
97 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
98 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079-80 (citing, in part, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985)); see
also Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26 (using the terms "emotionally disturbed" and "mentally ill"); Jack-
son v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 732, 737 (1972) (using the terms "incompetency" and "insanity"); cf.
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (acknowledging
State's authority to commit a person when there is "some medical justification for doing so"); see gen-
erally 2 PERLIN, supra note 10, § 8.32; 3 PERLIN, supra note 10, § 17.17.
99 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2079-80.
100 Id. Interestingly, in a footnote, the majority noted:
We recognize, of course, that psychiatric professionals are not in complete harmony in
casting pedophilia, or paraphilias in general, as "mental illnesses." Compare Brief for American
Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae 26 with Brief for Menninger Foundation et al. as Amici
Curiae 22-25. These disagreements, however, do not tie the State's hands in setting the bounds of
its civil commitment laws. In fact, it is precisely where such disagreement exists that legislatures
have been afforded the widest latitude in drafting such statutes. Cf. Jones v. United States, 463
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The Court also rejected Hendricks's argument that the SVPA estab-
lished criminal proceedings, and thus violated both the Double Jeopardy
and Ex Post Facto provisions of the Constitution. Turning first to Hen-
dricks's double jeopardy arguments, it found that the Act implicated neither
"of the two primary objectives of criminal punishment: retribution or deter-
rence,"101 reasoning-as to retribution-that the Act "does not affix culpa-
bility for prior criminal conduct" (noting further that a criminal conviction
is not a prerequisite for commitment under the Act) and that no finding of
criminal intent is required as a precedent to a commitment order ("an im-
portant element in distinguishing criminal from civil statutes").0 2 It also
found that, as persons subject to the SVPA suffered from a mental condition
that prevented them from "exercising adequate control over their behavior,"
the Act could not be seen as functioning as a deterrent.10 3 Although the
SVPA does involve an "affirmative restraint," that, in and of itself, does not
mean that the Act imposes punishment: "If detention for the purpose of
protecting the community from harm necessarily constituted punishment,
then all involuntary civil commitments would have to be considered pun-
ishment. But we have never so held."1 4
The Court rejected Hendricks's other arguments as to the Act's puni-
tiveness as well. Although the Act allows for potentially indefinite com-
mitment, that possibility is constitutionally trumped by the fact that duration
is "linked" to the purposes of the commitment ("to hold the person until his
mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others"); moreo-
ver, there is a built-in year-long limit to a single commitment (after which
time, the lower court must again determine whether the individual still sat-
isfies the commitment standard).,l 5
Hendricks argued further that the use of procedural protections that are
traditionally found in criminal trials transformed the proceedings into
criminal ones. The majority rejected this argument as well. Kansas's pro-
vision of these protections, the Court found, simply demonstrated the "great
care" that the state had taken to confine only a "narrow class of particularly
dangerous individuals.., after meeting the strictest procedural standards,"
and this decision did not thus transform a civil commitment proceeding into
a criminal one.
06
U.S. 354, 365, n.13 (1983) (parallel citations omitted). As we have explained regarding congres-
sional enactments, when a legislature "undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scien-
tific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to
rewrite legislation." Id. at 370 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id. at n.3.
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Finally on this point, Hendricks claimed that the Act was punitive be-
cause it did not offer any legitimate "treatment." Here, the majority noted
that "incapacitation" may be a legitimate end of the civil law, and added
that it had never held that "the Constitution prevents a State from civilly
detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who nevertheless
pose a danger to others."' 07 It would be of "little value," the opinion con-
tinued, "to require treatment as a precondition for civil confinement of the
dangerously insane when no acceptable treatment existed. To conclude
otherwise would obligate a State to release certain confined individuals who
were both mentally ill and dangerous simply because they could not be suc-
cessfully treated for their afflictions."'0 8
Noting that states had "wide latitude" in developing treatment regi-
mens, and that a state could serve its purpose "by committing sexually dan-
gerous person[s] . . . to an institution expressly designed to provide
psychiatric care and treatment," the Court concluded that Kansas had thus
"doubtless satisfied its obligation to provide available treatment."' 0 9 Be-
yond this, while it conceded that the specific treatment program offered
Hendricks "may have seemed somewhat meager," the Court placed great
weight on a statement made at oral argument by Kansas's counsel that, by
that time, Hendricks was receiving more than thirty hours of treatment per
week."o
On this point, it concluded:
Where the State has "disavowed any punitive intent"; limited confine-
ment to a small segment of particularly dangerous individuals; provided strict
procedural safeguards; directed that confined persons be segregated from the
general prison population and afforded the same status as others who have
been civilly committed; recommended treatment if such is possible; and per-
mitted immediate release upon a showing that the individual is no longer dan-
gerous or mentally impaired, we cannot say that it acted with punitive intent.
We therefore hold that the Act does not establish criminal proceedings and that
involuntary confinement pursuant to the Act is not punitive." l
The Court thus concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not
violated." 2 Similarly, because it had determined that the Act did not im-
107 Id. at 2084. Added the Court: "A State could hardly be seen as furthering a 'punitive' purpose
by involuntarily confining persons afflicted with an untreatable, highly contagious disease." Id.
1o8 Id.
109 Id. at 2085 n.4 (citing in part Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986)); see generally 1
PERLIN, supra note 10, § 2C-4.1 lc (2d ed.).
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pose punishment, it ruled that its application did not present Ex Post Facto
concerns.
113
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment to express "caution against
dangers inherent when a civil confinement law is used in conjunction with
the criminal process, whether or not the law is given retroactive applica-
tion."' 4 Although he found from the record before the Court that the Kan-
sas statute passed constitutional muster, he expressed this concern: "If...
civil confinement were to become a mechanism for retribution or general
deterrence, or if it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a
category to offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified,
our precedents would not suffice to validate it.'"15
Justice Breyer dissented in an opinion joined in full by Justices Souter
and Stevens, and in part by Justice Ginsburg. Although the dissenters
agreed that the SVPA's definition of "mental abnormality" satisfied sub-
stantive due process, they concluded that the failure to provide Hendricks
with adequate treatment gave the Act a punitive cast, and, as a result, vio-
lated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.
The dissent began with what it characterized as "the area of agree-
ment" with the majority. 6 Looking to Foucha'1 and Addington'18 as the
sources of the rule that civil commitment of a person who was mentally ill
and dangerous did not necessarily violate the Due Process Clause (assum-
ing the commitment took place "pursuant to proper procedures and eviden-
tiary standards," Justice Breyer set out three reasons why he believed
Kansas "acted within the limits that the Due Process Clause substantively
sets."1 19
First, although he conceded that there was controversy within the psy-
chiatric profession as to whether a disorder such as pedophilia was a mental
illness (referring, on this point to amicus briefs filed by the American Psy-
chiatric Association, arguing that it was not, and by the Menninger Founda-
tion, arguing that it was), he concluded that there was no question that it
could be denominated a mental disorder. Although the fact that there was
an intraprofessional dispute might help "inform the law by setting the
bounds of what is reasonable, ... it cannot here decide just how States must
write their laws within those bounds."'12
0
Second, Justice Breyer found that Hendricks's abnormality, which in-
cluded "a specific, serious, and highly unusual inability to control his ac-
13 See id. at 2086.
114 Id. at 2087 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
"15 Id.
116 Id. at 2089 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg did not join in this portion of the dissent.
117 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
11 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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tions," was "akin to insanity for purposes of confinement," a sort of "irre-
sistible impulse."'121 Third, this mental abnormality made Hendricks dan-
gerous, and, as Hendricks appeared to fall outside the limits of Kansas's
general civil commitment statute, which allowed for commitment only of
those who lacked capacity to make informed treatment decisions,12 2 it was
permissible for Kansas to create separate legislation upon which to base
confinement of a mentally disordered, dangerous person such as Hen-
dricks?
23
Justice Breyer did not see Hendricks as a case that required the Court
to determine whether the Due Process Clause always required treatment (if,
for example, it forbade civil confinement of an untreatable, mentally ill,
dangerous person), since Kansas argued that pedophilia was a treatable dis-
order, and at least two amicus groups made similar, uncontradicted, asser-
tions.'24 The question to be asked, then, was this: does the Due Process
Clause require a state to provide treatment that it concedes is available to a
person whom it concedes is treatable?
125
Justice Breyer then turned his attention to the Ex Post Facto Clause ar-
gument.126 He found the postcommitment institutionalization under the Act
to bear "obvious" resemblances to criminal punishment. 27 First, testimony
of a state official revealed that "confinement takes place in the psychiatric
wing of a prison hospital where those whom the Act confines and ordinary
prisoners are treated alike."' 128 Second, he found that incapacitation, one of
the basic objectives of the Act, was also an important purpose of punish-
ment. 29 Third, the Act only imposes its sanctions on an individual who
"has previously committed a criminal offense.' 130 And finally, the proce-
dural guarantees and standards of the Act are those "traditionally associated
with the criminal law.'
131
These criteria, standing alone, would not be enough to transform a civil
commitment into punishment, Justice Breyer conceded. But other factors
were sufficient upon which to base a finding that the SVPA was a punitive
121 Id. at 2088-89.
122 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(h) (West 1997).
123 See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2089 (Breyer, J., dissenting):
Because (1) many mental health professionals consider pedophilia a serious mental disorder;
and (2) Hendricks suffers from a classic case of irresistible impulse, namely he is so afflicted with
pedophilia that he cannot "control the urge" to molest children; and (3) his pedophilia presents a
serious danger to those children; I believe that Kansas can classify Hendricks as "mentally ill" and
"dangerous" as this Court used those terms in Foucha.
124 See id. at 2090.
125 See id.
126 Justice Ginsburg joined in the remainder of the dissent.
127 See Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2090 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128 Id.
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statute. First, the dissenters looked at the time when the petition for further
commitment was filed against Hendricks: "when a State believes that
treatment does exist, and then couples that admission with a legislatively
required delay of such treatment until a person is at the end of his jail term
(so that further incapacitation is therefore necessary), such a legislative
scheme begins to look punitive. 3  And, they considered the teachings of
Allen v. Ilinois'33 that the availability of treatment was a "touchstone" in
distinguishing whether a statute's purpose was civil or punitive.13
Considered through this lens, the SVPA, as applied to Hendricks, was
a punitive statute, according to Justice Breyer. Treatment was not a signifi-
cant objective of the Act (being "incidental at best");135 at the time of Hen-
dricks's commitment, in fact, the state had neither funded any treatment
programs nor entered into treatment contracts and provided "little, if any,
qualified treatment staff."'' 36 The commitment program's own director had
stated that Hendricks was receiving "essentially no treatment."'
37
In addition, the fact that commitment proceedings under the SVPA did
not begin until after offenders had served nearly their entire criminal sen-
tence suggested that treatment was not a significant concern in the enact-
ment of the law:
An Act that simply seeks confinement, of course, would not need to begin
civil commitment proceedings sooner. Such an Act would have to begin pro-
ceedings only when an offender's prison term ends, threatening his release
from the confinement that imprisonment assures. But it is difficult to see why
rational legislators who seek treatment would write the Act in this way-
providing treatment years after the criminal act that indicated its necessity ....
And it is particularly difficult to see why legislators who specifically wrote
into the statute a finding that "prognosis for rehabilitation ... in a prison
setting is poor" would leave an offender in that setting for months or years
before beginning treatment. This is to say, the timing provisions of the statute
confirm the Kansas Supreme Court's view that treatment was not a particularly
important legislative objective. 138
Other factors compelled the same conclusion. As it applied to Hen-
dricks, the Kansas law did not require consideration of using "less restric-
tive alternatives, such as postrelease supervision" as a term of commitment;
such "less restrictive alternative" language is found in almost all involun-
tary civil commitment statutes, and its absence here "can help to show that
132 Id. at 2091-92.
133 478 U.S. 364, 367-73 (1986).
134 Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. at 2092.
135 Id. (quoting Matter of Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996)).
136 Id. at 2093 (citing Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131, 136).
137 Id. (quoting Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131,136).
131 Id. at 2094 (citation omitted).
1267
92:1247 (1998)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
[the] legislature's 'purpose ... was to punish.' ' 139 Finally, a consideration
of contemporary sex offender statutes from other jurisdictions revealed no
other jurisdiction that contained all of the punitive aspects of the Kansas
law (as to timing of invocation of the SVPA process and failure to consider
less restrictive alternatives):
Thus the practical experience of other States, as revealed by their statutes,
confirms what the Kansas Supreme Court's finding, the timing of the civil
commitment proceeding, and the failure to consider less restrictive alternatives,
themselves suggest, namely, that for Ex Post Facto Clause purposes, the pur-
pose of the Kansas Act (as applied to previously convicted offenders) has a
punitive, rather than a purely civil, purpose.140
The dissenters rejected Kansas's arguments to the contrary, and re-
stated what they saw as the scope of the state's commitment power under
Addington v. Texas:
[A] State is free to commit those who are dangerous and mentally ill in
order to treat them. Nor does my decision preclude a State from deciding that
a certain subset of people are mentally ill, dangerous, and untreatable, and that
confinement of this subset is therefore necessary (again, assuming that all the
procedural safeguards of Addington are in place). But when a State decides of-
fenders can be treated and confines an offender to provide that treatment, but
then refuses to provide it, the refusal to treat while a person is fully incapaci-
tated begins to look punitive.
14 1
Finally, the dissenters took issue with the majority's reading of the re-
cord below that had suggested that Hendricks was untreatable. A careful
reading of the Kansas Supreme Court's decision, however, revealed to the
dissenters that Hendricks was treatable, but remained untreated.
42
Because the SVPA imposed punishment on Hendricks, it thus violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause, the dissenters concluded:
The statutory provisions before us do amount to punishment primarily
because, as I have said, the legislature did not tailor the statute to fit the non-
139 Id. at 2094 (quoting, in part, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
140 117 S. Ct. at 2094. Iowa also delayed civil commitment until the end of the offender's prison
term and failed to require consideration of less restrictive alternatives. However, that law-see IOWA
CODE ANN. § 709C.12 (West 1987)-applies only prospectively, thus avoiding constitutional problems
under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.
141 117 S. Ct. at 2094.
142 See id. The basis for the majority's conclusion that Hendricks was receiving treatment came
from two sources, according to the dissenters: a statement made by counsel for Kansas at oral argument,
and a trial judge's statement in the record of a habeas proceeding in Hendricks's case that took place a
year after his commitment. Neither, the dissenters concluded, served as appropriate justification for the
conclusion that Hendricks was receiving treatment at the time he filed suit. See id. at 2096.
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punitive civil aim of treatment, which it concedes exists in Hendricks' case.
The Clause in these circumstances does not stand as an obstacle to achieving
important protections for the public's safety; rather it provides an assurance
that, where so significant a restriction of an individual's basic freedoms is at




Hendricks is a troubling opinion on at least eleven levels, and each
level demonstrates its pretextuality. First, it indicates that a majority (al-
beit, a bare one) of the Supreme Court is comfortable with a statutory
scheme' 44 that has the potential of transforming psychiatric treatment facili-
ties into de facto prisons and that uses mental health treatment as a form of
social control,145 in Howard Zonana's words, endorsing "the medicalization
of deviancy,"' 46 thus making the statutory promise of treatment an empty
one. Professor Stephen McAllister, who helped represent Kansas in the
Hendricks case, states flatly, "Hendricks is probably best understood and
explained as a civil commitment case."'47 This pretext colors the remainder
of the Hendricks opinion.
Second, the opinion suggests, that for social control purposes, the ma-
jority is comfortable with expansive legislative definitions of "mental dis-
order" that go far beyond what the drafters of the standard diagnostic
nomenclature ever intended.148 Assume that, in its next version of its Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual, the American Psychiatric Association elimi-
nated pedophilia as a "mental disorder," and either bypassed all discussion
141 Id. at 2098 (citing THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 , p. 466 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961) (A. Hamilton)).
144 As the Kansas law is the most punitive of any of the SVPA laws, see id. at 2095-96 (Breyer, I.,
dissenting), it is certainly reasonable to assume that any less punitive such law will also pass constitu-
tional muster. See Eric Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional Boundaries
on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 158 (1996) ("As the Court decides the sex offender
cases, it will likely draw a bright line on the constitutional map of civil commitment.") (article published
prior to the decision in Hendricks).
145 See PERLIN, supra note 10, § 15.25A, text accompanying note 479.36 (1997 Cum. Supp.), dis-
cussing Justice Thomas's dissent in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), in this context; see also,
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND MENTAL DISABILITY § 4.38 (1994).
146 Howard Zonana, The Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 278 SCIENCE 1248, 1248 (1997).
147 Stephen McAllister, Punishing Sex Offenders, 46 KAN. L. REV. 27, 60-61 (1997).
148 See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Psychiatric Association in support of Appellee, Kansas v.
Hendricks (No. 95-1649) (available from LEXIS, GENFED, BRIEFS library):
When a State invokes this power, the reality of the confinement must support the claim that
it is in the individual's interest. If "mental illness" were freely subject to legislative definition
(through new terms like "mental abnormality" or otherwise), or if anyone "crazy" or "sick" enough
to engage in repeated serious offenses could be civilly confined for that reason, the limits on depri-
vations of liberty to protect the public safety would quickly disappear. When an assertion of a par-
ens patriae interest is not well grounded, the State either is acting to punish the individual, and thus
has to meet the requirements for a valid criminal sanction, or is acting to serve others' interests by
preventive detention, and thus has to meet the stringent standards for such action-neither of
which Kansas can do.
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of the condition or created a new category for pedophilia, for example,
"violent sexually based behavior." Further assume that in response to that
change, the legislature of the state of Kansas changes its SVPA laws to then
read:
[A]ny person who has been convicted of or charged with a sexually vio-
lent offense and who suffers from a condition characterized as violent sexu-
ally-based behavior which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory
acts of sexual violence.
Now assume a case comes up in Kansas that is identical to Hendricks
in all aspects. Does anyone truly believe that that would cause this Su-
preme Court to reconsider the question of whether such a defendant could
be institutionalized as a sexually violent predator? The fact that such recon-
sideration strikes us as implausible should suggest to us the extent to which
Hendricks is a pretextual case.
149
Third, the opinion rejects the weight of contemporaneous research
suggesting that treatment is available for "sexually violent predators" (such
as Hendricks) that can significantly reduce the rate of recidivism. 150  Are
SVPA offenders receiving treatment? Does treatment for sex offenders
work? In her recent study, Professor Leonore Simon concluded that there is
no empirical evidence to suggest that sex offenders have different recidi-
vism rates than non-sex offenders.' 5 ' If she is right, what are the implica-
tions of this conclusion? Do the answers to these important questions
matter to the Supreme Court? If some treatment works, is that the sort of
treatment available to Leroy Hendricks or to others committed pursuant to
SVPA laws? And if such treatment is not available, does that add another
layer of pretext to the opinion?
Fourth, Hendricks strains to characterize a punitive statute-the most
punitive of any of the new generation of SVPA laws-as "civil," in a way
that can only be called "pretextual.', 152 Professor John LaFond has recently
149 See Note, Involuntary Commitment of Violent Sexual Predators, 11 HARV. L. REV. 259 (1997)
(discussing how Hendricks Court "ratcheted down the mental illness requirement" necessary for civil
commitment).
150 See e.g., Judith Becker & John Hunter, Evaluation of Treatment Outcome for Adult Perpetrators
of Child Sexual Abuse, 19 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 74 (1992); Janice Marques et al., Effects of Cognitive-
Behavioral Treatment on Sex Offender Recidivism, 21 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 28, 28-52 (1994); W.L.
Marshall & W.D. Pithers, A Reconsideration of Treatment Outcome with Sex Offenders, 21 CRIM. JUST.
& BEHAV. 10, 10-27 (1994). On the ways that social science is used in sex offender cases in general,
see Janus, supra note 30. There is no current empirical evidence to suggest that sex offenders have dif-
ferent recidivism rates than do nonsex offenders. But see Berliner, supra note 7, at nn.36-65 (arguing
that there is no single "sex offender" recidivism rate because sex offenders are a highly heterogeneous
group).
151 See Leonore Simon, The Myth of Sex Offender Specialization: An Empirical Analysis, 23 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 387, 390,401 (1997).
152 See I PERLIN, supra note 10, § 2D-2.1 (2d ed.).
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argued that Hendricks is the "ultimate overlap of criminal and civil com-
mitment";153 this overlap is clearly a pretextual one, that "will also further
blur the relationship" between the two commitment processes,154 and that
augurs uneasy future jurisprudential developments in this area of the law.
As a recent student note argues, after Hendricks, "the risk increases that a
potentially lifelong deprivation of liberty via the civil system will be im-
posed to serve goals traditionally and rightfully reserved for the criminal
system-retribution and deterrence.' 5  Again, Professor McAllister's Es-
say--one enthusiastic about the opinion-supports this position. 6
Fifth, the Hendricks decision conflates and confuses legal and medical
terminology. 57 Justice Thomas's choice of language suggests that he is no
more comfortable writing in this area of the law today than he was when he
dissented five years ago in Riggins v. Nevada'58 or in Foucha v. Louisi-
ana. 159
Sixth, much of the body of constitutional law regarding the right to re-
fuse treatment draws on the barely remembered case of Knecht v. Gill-
man.'6 0 There, in 1973, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals told us, "The
mere characterization of an act as 'treatment' does not insulate it from
[Constitutional] inquiry.' 161 Knecht was a refreshingly candid opinion that
stripped bare the facade of punishment regimes couched in purportedly
therapeutic language, and was one of the first moves away from a pretextual
mental disability law jurisprudence in the early 1970s. A careful examina-
tion of the chronology and etiology of right- to-refuse- treatment law shows
that this precept was central to all further developments in this area.'62
153 John Q. LaFond, Comments at American Association of Law Schools Section on Law and
Mental Disability Panel Discussion (January 1998).
154 Note, supra note 149, at 266.
155 Id.
156 See McAllister, supra note 147, at 42-45.
157 See, e-g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2080 (1997). The Court had rejected Hendricks'
argument that Addington and Foucha required proof of a mental illness, and that his "mental abnormal-
ity" was not such an illness (but was rather a term coined by the Kansas legislature). See supra note 98
and accompanying text.
15s 504 U.S. 127 (1992); see PERLIN, supra note 10, § 5.65A (1997 Cum. Supp.); PERLIN, supra
note 145, § 2.18; see generally Michael L. Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law, 16 INT'L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 151 (1993); Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than "Dodging
Lions and Wastin' Time"? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in
Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOLOGY, PUB. POL'Y & L. 114 (1996); Michael L.
Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the Development of Mental Disability Law
Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 47 (1993) [hereinafter Perlin & Dorfman, Sanism].
159 504 U.S. 71 (1992). See PERLIN, supra note 10, § 15.25A (1997 Cum. Supp.); see generally,
Perlin & Dorfman, Sanism, supra note 158.
160 488 F. 2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
161 Id. at 1140; see 2 PERLIN, supra note 10, § 5.05, at 232-33.
162 See, eg., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D. N.J. 1978). Rennie is discussed extensively in
2 PERLIN, supra note 10, §§ 5.10-5.37, at 252-326.
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Hendricks turns this jurisprudence on its head by sanctioning extended
punishment under the rubric of treatment, treatment which it candidly and
disinterestedly concedes (giving the issue the most positive possible spin) is
barely available. Calling a prison a hospital does not make it a hospital; at
most, it can only assuage the consciences of those seeking to rationalize a
pretextual decision. Interestingly, Professor McAllister states that sex of-
fenders generally are accorded "the same civil rights as are other mental
patients., 163 It strains credulity to even conjure a scenario in which a trial
judge grants the application of a SVP to refuse the administration of anti-
psychotic medicine.
Seventh, we now know that the money that is spent for such units-
one million dollars a year for a unit housing thirteen pedophiles'6--comes
from the state's mental health budget.1 65 This results in a significant dimi-
nution of resources for those in Kansas who are genuinely mentally ill and
who have traditionally received mental health treatment. The reality that
this population is being deprived of scarce and needed resources is another
pretext of the Hendricks case.
Eighth, on its facts, the Hendricks case appears to be an easy one. The
defendant himself testified that, if released, he would, under stress, not be
able to "control the urge" to molest children. 166 But this moment of candid
self-reportage should not obscure the more complicated and persistent issue
of the degree to which mental health professionals can predict future
dangerousness.
Researchers have made tremendous gains in recent years in their un-
derstanding of the relationship between "dangerousness" and "mental ill-
ness," and the implications of these new findings. More conceptual light
has been shed on this murky area of the law by the recent publication of re-
search by the MacArthur Foundation's Network on Mental Health and the
Law (the Network). For the past five years, the Network has conducted an
extensive study of three areas that are essential to an informed understand-
ing of mental disability law: competence, coercion, and risk.167  On the
question of the relationship between mental illness and dangerousness, John
Monahan, the director of the MacArthur Network and the leading thinker in
163 McAllister, supra note 147, at 44.
164 Howard Zonana, Comments at American Association of Law Schools Section on Law and
Mental Disability Panel Discussion (January 1998).
165 See id.
166 Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (1997). He added that the only sure way he could
keep from abusing children in the future was "to die." Id. at 278.
167 See Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: A Summary of the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study and
an Introduction to the Special Theme, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 3, 3 (1996); The MacArthur Vio-
lence Risk Assessment Study, 16 AM. PSYCHOL. L. SOC. NEWSLETTER No. 3, Fall 1996, at 1; see also
Thomas Grisso & Alan Tomkins, Communicating Violence Risk Assessments, 51 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
928 (1996).
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this field of study,1 68 concluded that while there appeared to be a "greater-
than-chance relationship between mental disorder and violent behavior,"
169
mental illness makes "at best a trivial contribution to the overall level of
violence in society. 170
The Hendricks Court largely glides over this issue. But paradoxically,
the substance of its decision-placing so many of its chips on the accuracy
of certain dangerousness predictions-is likely to "reignite" the accuracy-
of-prediction debate 7 1 from precisely the opposite perspective taken by
Monahan and his colleagues. Its failure to deal with Monahan's recent work
is yet another pretext.
Ninth, Hendricks misses the point captured clearly and concisely by
the Kansas Supreme Court:
Mental illness is defined in K.S.A. 59-2902(h) as meaning any person
who: "(1) [i]s suffering from a severe mental disorder to the extent that such
person is in need of treatment; (2) lacks capacity to make an informed deci-
sion concerning treatment; and (3) is likely to cause harm to self or others."
Here, neither the language of the Act nor the State's evidence supports a find-
ing that "mental abnormality or personality disorder," as used in 59- 29a02(a),
is a "mental illness" as defined in 59-2902(h). Absent such a finding, the Act
does not satisfy the constitutional standard set out in Addington and Foucha.
Justice White, speaking for the majority of the United States Supreme Court in
Foucha, clearly stated that to indefinitely confine as dangerous one who has a
personality disorder or antisocial personality but is not mentally ill is constitu-
tionally impermissible. 504 U.S. at 78. Similarly, to indefinitely confine as
dangerous one who has a mental abnormality is constitutionally impermissi-
ble.1/2
The Supreme Court's rejection of the spirit and the words of this sec-
tion of the state court opinion is yet another pretext.
168 Professor Monahan has been characterized as "the leading thinker on this issue" in Barefoot v.
Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901, n.7 (1983), and id. at 920 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169 John Monahan, Clinical and Actuarial Predictions of Violence, in I MODERN SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY (David Faigman et al. eds., 1997) § 7-2.2.1,
at 314. Clinicians were found to be no better than chance when it came to predicting violence among
female patients. See Mental Illness and Violent Crime, NAT'L INST. JUST. RES. PREVIEW, Oct. 1996, at
1,2.
170 Monahan, supra note 169, at 315; see also, Jeffrey Swanson et al., Psychotic Symptoms and Dis-
orders and the Risk of Violent Behaviour in the Community, 6 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 309,
310 (1996) (mental disorder a "modest risk factor" for the occurrence of interpersonal violent behavior).
171 See Joseph McCann, Risk Assessment and the Prediction of Violent Behavior, 44 FED. LAW. 18,
Oct. 1997, compare Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993) (psychiatric predictions of dangerousness
in the cases of menally ill persons "are inaccurate").
172 Matter of Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996).
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Tenth, any analysis of Hendricks from a therapeutic jurisprudence per-
spective17 3 immediately highlights its underlying pretextuality. Professor
Keri Gould recently asked these eight therapeutic jurisprudence-based
questions about the Hendricks case:
174
" Is Hendricks therapeutic for the public or for victims?
" After Hendricks, does the allegedly "dispassionate" police power
give way so as to satiate public rage?
- Is it possible for any such scheme to be therapeutic without the pro-
vision of mandatory postrelease outreach?
- Does the fact that therapy does not start (under the Kansas statute, at
least) until after the defendant's sentence ends attenuate any potential thera-
peutic outcomes?
" Is coerced sex offender treatment therapeutic?
" Is there any incentive for a defendant to engage in any meaningful
therapy programs while in prison if what is said during such participation
can be used against the defendant after his sentence terminates?
0 Will Hendricks lead to long-term commitments of those who "act
out" sexually at civil mental hospitals? 75
* Will Hendricks lead some prosecutors to use involuntary civil com-
mitment as a means of "boosting" criminal cases?
173 "Therapeutic jurisprudence" is a new model by which we can assess the ultimate impact of case
law and legislation that affects persons with mental disabilities. It studies the role of the law as a thera-
peutic agent, recognizing that substantive rules, legal procedures and lawyers' roles may have either
therapeutic or antitherapeutic consequences, and questioning whether such rules, procedures and roles
can or should be reshaped so as to enhance their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due proc-
ess principles. See e.g., ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David Wexler & Bruce Winick eds.,
1991); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David
Wexler & Bruce Winick eds., 1996); 1 PERLIN, supra note 10, §§ 2D-3 to 2D-3.1 (2d ed.);
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 53; THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON
MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Bruce Winick ed., 1998); Bibliography of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 915 (1993); Michael L. Perlin, hat Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 10
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993); Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilem-
mas to Ponder, I PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 193 (1995); David Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeuti-
cally, 5 APP'L. & PREVEN. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996); David Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental
Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1992); David Wexler, Reflec-
tions on the Scope of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, I PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 220 (1995).
174 Keri Gould, Remarks at American Association of Law Schools Section on Law and Mental Dis-
ability Panel Discussion (January 1998); see also Keri Gould, If It's a Duck and Dangerous-
Permanently Clip Its Wings or Treat It Till It Can Fly? A Therapeutic Perspective on Difficult
Decisions, Short-Sighted Solutions, and Violent Sexual Predators After Kansas v. Hendricks, 31 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 859, 880-81 (1998).
175 On the issue of the right of mental patients to engage in voluntary sexual interaction, see, for ex-
ample, Douglas Mossman, Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfnan, Sex on the Wards: Conundrafor
Clinicians, 25 J. AMER. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 441 (1997); Michael L. Perlin, "Make Promises by
the Hour": Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947 (1997);
Perlin, Frontier, supra note 34.
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The answers to these questions, which I think should be relatively self-
evident from the previous discussion, reflect the decision's pretextuality.
Eleventh, Hendricks is pretextual because, in the end, it is simply an
authorization for the use of extensive preventive detention, dressed up in
mental health language. 76 It is this pretext that, to some extent, swallows
and engulfs all the others, and demonstrates the opinion's underlying mere-
triciousness. The "rhetoric and the result" of Hendricks may appeal to the
general public, but the decision's failure to "offer a principle to cabin the
potentially broad application of its revamped civil commitment jurispru-
dence1'' 7 is its ultimate pretext.
7 8
V. THE SUPREME COURT AND PRETEXTUALITY
If we look at the Supreme Court's mental disability law jurisprudence
over the past two decades, we see instantly that, in large part, it is a juris-
prudence of pretextuality. There are exceptions-Riggins v. Nevada,179
Foucha v. Louisiana,180 Zinermon v. Burch,' Cooper v. Oklahoma,82 per-
176 Stephen Morse, Comments at American Association of Law Schools Section of Law and Mental
Disability Panel Discussion (January 1998); see also John Zanini, Considering Hendricks v. Kansasfor
Massachusetts: Can the Commonwealth Constitutionally Detain Dangerous Persons Who Are Not
Mentally ll?, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 427 (1997) (article written prior to Hen-
dricks decision).
177 Note, supra note 149, at 267.
178 The dissent is also not without problems. Although it does reveal the punitive nature of the
Kansas statute (exposing the pretextual nature of the majority opinion, and leading to the appropriate
conclusion that the Ex Post Facto Clause should apply to the case), its discussion of civil commitment
law, especially its conflation of civil commitment law and insanity law, as reflected in Justice Breyer's
finding that Hendricks's abnormality, including "a specific, serious, and highly unusual inability to con-
trol his actions"--was "akin to insanity for purposes of confinement," a sort of "irresistible impulse,"
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 2089 (1997), is confusing and somewhat circular. Its failure to
conclude that the Kansas statute violates substantive due process, however, is the opinion's most trou-
bling aspect. See generally Janus, supra note 144, at 213:
A system that compromises our traditional constitutional values cannot last. Sex offender
commitment laws confuse too many important values. Obscuring the critical role that mental dis-
order plays in defining the state's police powers, these laws embrace a dangerous jurisprudence of
prevention. We must find other, more truthful and more principled ways to prevent sexual vio-
lence.
179 504 U.S. 127 (1992) (affirming right of competent criminal defendants seeking to plead insanity
to refuse antipsychotic medication).
ISO 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (limiting continued institutionalization in case of insanity acquittee who is
no longer mentally ill).
181 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (discussing procedural due process rights of "voluntary" patients in invol-
untary civil commitment process).
182 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996) (finding allocation of burden of proof by quantum of clear and convinc-
ing evidence to defendant seeking to be declared incompetent to stand trial to be unconstitutional).
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haps Mills v. Rogers,'83 perhaps City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cen-
ter184-but the dominant theme is one of pretextuality.
The Court's rationale in Addington v. Texas185 for rejecting the criminal
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in involuntary civil commitment
cases-that "layers of professional review, and observation of the patient's
condition and the concerns of families and friends generally will provide
continuous opportunities for an erroneous commitment to be cor-
rected"18 6-- is pretextual, as is its assumption that any person subject to that
process must be "genuinely mentally ill. 187 Its misassumptions in Parham
v. J.R.' 88-about parent-child relationships, about the conduct of juvenile
commitment hearings-are equally pretextual.189 Other pretexts are clear in
such cases as Youngberg v. Romeo,190 Washington v. Harper, 191 Jones v.
United States, 92 Godinez v. Moran,193 Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
183 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (establishing right of civil patients to refuse antipsychotic medication). See
generally, 2 PERLIN, supra note 10, § 5.33.
184 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying Equal Protection Clause to challenge to local zoning ordinance
excluding congregate residences for persons with mental disabilities). See generally, 2 PERLIN, supra
note 10, § 7.22.
185 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
186 Id. at 428-29.
187 Id. at 429. See generally, 1 PERLIN, supra note 10, § 2C-5.1 a, at 395-400 (2d ed.).
188 442 U.S. 584 (1979); see supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
189 See David Ferleger, Special Problems in the Commitment of Children, in I LEGAL RIGHTS OF
MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS 397, 404 (Paul Friedman ed., 1979) (Parham and companion decision
"ignore the facts, distort the law and condemn children to second-class citizenship"); Perry & Melton,
supra note 78, at 634 (listing "fifteen empirical assumptions [in Parham], many of them directly con-
trary to existing social-science research"). See generally, 1 PERLIN, supra note 10, § 2C-7.1 a, at 467-77
(2d ed.).
190 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (right to habilitation). In supporting its conclusion that professionals in
mental retardation "disagree strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or pro-
foundly retarded individuals is even possible," the Court cited to four articles from the journal Analysis
and Intervention in Disabilities. Id. at 316-17 n.20. However, a reading of the very articles cited by the
Court-articles never cited previously or subsequently by any other court in any reported opinion-
shows that they considered only the "small fraction" of persons with mental retardation who were
"permanently ambulatory" and "extremely debilitated," a grouping that is a tiny percentage of all
institutionalized persons. Here, the Court's selection of social science data appears pretextual as well.
See David Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 628-29
(1983), discussed in 2 PERLIN, supra note 10, § 4.33 at 184 n.636.
191 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (limiting treatment refusal rights of convicted prisoners). See generally,
PERLIN, supra note 10, § 5.64A at 252-63 (1997 Cum. Supp.) (discussing pretextual significance of
Court's refusal to resolve debate as to significance of drugs' side-effects, and its improper reliance on
Parham-a juvenile commitment case-for the proposition that a hearing officer need not be a judicial
one); Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 158.
192 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (limiting substantive and procedural due process rights of insanity acquit-
tees). See generally, I PERLIN, supra note 10, § 3.43 at 325-35 (discussing Court's over-deference to
legislative judgments, and criticizing majority's refusal to distinguish between nonviolent and violent
crimes in this context); id. at 333 (quoting commentator arguing that decision reveals court's "unwilling-
ness.., to contradict public sentiment in such a controversial area").
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Halderman,194 Shannon v. United States,'95 and Heller v. Doe. 196 Hendricks
builds on this sorry history of pretextuality.
The State of Kansas and its supporters may read the opinion as a suc-
cess. But it is a jurisprudential failure. To return to the Dylan lyric that be-
gins my title, failure is no success at all.
193 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (setting standard for competence to waive counsel or plead guilty same as
for competence to stand trial). See generally, PERLIN, supra note 10, §§ 14.20A, 14.21A at 611-14, 616-
18 (1997 Cum. Supp.); Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave". Godinez v. Moran, Colin
Ferguson, and the trial of Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. Sl. & L. 61 (1996)
(criticizing pretextual bases of Godinez decision).
194 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (stating that Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from ordering state of-
ficials to conform their actions to state law). See generally, 2 PERLIN, supra note 10, § 7.15, at 631-36;
id. at 632 (quoting commentator arguing that true goal of Pennhurst Court was "to limit the lower fed-
eral courts' power to reform state and local social institutions on the basis of alleged federal law viola-
tions").
195 512 U.S. 573 (1994) (stating that defendant has no right in federal criminal trial to have jury in-
formed of consequences of insanity acquittal). See generally, PERLIN, supra note 10, § 15.16A at 649-
55 (1997 Cum. Supp.); id. at 655 (decision is either "naive, meretricious, or simply deceitful").
196 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (finding no equal protection violation in statute that established heightened
standard for commitment of persons with mental illness and lesser standard for those with mental retar-
dation). See generally, PERLIN, supra note 10, § 2C-5.c, at 404-409 (2d ed..); id. at 130-31 (discussing
pretextual nature of majority's discussion of right to refuse treatment issues).
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